

Payments Under the Table in Latin America

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Introduction

Payments Under the Table:


Part of the wage of formal employees that is not reported in the payroll

1. Unlawful payments: avoids wage-related taxes
2. Frequency: in the concept of labor provision
3. Knowledge: known by both employer and employee


Traditional household surveys do not capture PUTs. *What are we missing?*

Introduction

Labor market with and without PUTs



(a) Not considering PUTs



(b) Considering PUTs

Comparison for a simulated economy with 30% of informal and 15% of semi-formal (PUTs) labor relationships

Motivation: Why should we care about PUTs?

1. State capacity and tax evasion

- PUTs imply evasion of social security contributions, income taxes, and other taxes on wages
- Relative to classic informality? Ambiguous
 - PUTs are only a fraction of the wages, while informality is the entire wage
 - PUT receivers have potentially higher wages than informal employees

2. Design of tax and social security systems

- Profit vs. revenue taxes (Kleven et al. [2014](#))
- Many social security benefits depend on the amount reported

3. Potential misallocation

- PUTs increase employer-employee surplus
- Heterogeneity in preferences/capabilities to engage in PUTs creates a wedge

4. Policy interventions

- PUTs have some ties with admin records (registered establishment and formal employees)
- Direct interventions can be evaluated with admin data (see Feinmann and Cardoza, 2024)

Related Literature

1. Tax evasion and third-party reporting

- Third-party reporting as a silver bullet to reduce tax evasion
→ IRS [2006](#); Slemrod [2007](#); Kleven et al. [2011](#); Kleven [2016](#); Kleven et al. [2016](#)
- Growing concern that collusive tax evasion can be profitable in many contexts
→ Doerr and Necker [2021](#); Naritomi [2019](#)
- Local evidence of PUTs in the context of policy evaluation
→ Bergolo and Cruces [2014](#); Lauletta and Bérigolo [2023](#); Bíró et al. [2022](#); Gavaille and Zasova [2023](#); Kumler et al. [2020](#); Pelek and Uysal [2016](#); Bjørneby et al. [2021](#)

This paper extends the work of Feinmann et al. [2022](#) to other Latin American countries to understand what drives differences across countries.

2. Informality and state capacity

- First margin: Non-registered firms
→ Rauch [1991](#); La Porta and Shleifer [2014](#); Haanwinckel [2020](#)
- Second margin: Registered firms hiring employees *off-the-books*
→ Ulyssea [2020](#); Ulyssea [2018](#)

We show the importance of extending the definition of informality further: formal employees in registered firms receive part of their wages under the table

Data Collection and Methodology

- First multi-country survey on PUTs in Latin America
- Online survey using vendor-provided panels
 - Data from Feinmann et al. [2022](#) for Brazil
 - Partnered with *Netquest* for Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru
- Restricted to formal employees in the private sector
- Identify PUT receivers, follow-up questions on *how* it works
- Dealt with representativity and truthful responses

Table with sample sizes by country

Data Coverage

We cover 6 of the 7 largest countries in Latin America and the Caribbean

→ The countries in our survey represent 79% of the total labor force in the region

Economic and Informal Employment Statistics for Countries in our Sample in 2023

Country	GDP per capita	Informal / Employees	Informal / Labor Force	Population
Chile	US\$ 15,923	6.1 %	29.2 %	19.49 M
Argentina	US\$ 10,729	35.96 %	49.4 %	45.81 M
Mexico	US\$ 10,045	37.65 %	57.6 %	126.19 M
Brazil	US\$ 8,570	22.17 %	47.2 %	213.99 M
Colombia	US\$ 6,131	28.36 %	62.1 %	51.27 M
Peru	US\$ 5,358	34.30 %	68.4 %	33.36 M

Source: [World Bank Database](#)

Harmonization

Cross-country studies presents representativity and comparability challenges

1. Within country representativity

- Each country's household survey to reweight observations
- Weight cells: income, firm size, age, gender, education
- Dropped 0.5% highest weights (outliers)

2. Crossed-country comparison

- Definition of formal employee (exclude self-employed and business owners)
 - 1) Does your employer contribute to your pension plan? (common to all)
 - 2) Question used in household survey (may differ across countries)
- Salaries expressed in each country's minimum wage
- Survey in Brazil does not contain some of the questions
- Results are re-weighted within a country, but non-weighted across countries

Results

Prevalence

Questions:


1. Do you receive PUTs?

→ *Yes, No*


2. If yes, what fraction of your wage is PUTs? (use mid-points)

→ *0-5%, 6-10%, 11-20%, 21-30%, 31-40%, 41-50%, >50%*

Prevalence: Extensive Margin



Prevalence: Intensive Margin




Income and Firm Size Distribution

Questions:

1. What is your monthly salary in your main job?
→ *Bins* (Brazil) *Number Entry* (other countries)
2. In addition to you, how many other employees work in your workplace?
→ 0, 1-4, 5-9, 10-49, 50-99, 100-499, 500-999, 1k-5k, >5k


PUTs across the Income Distribution



PUTs across the Income Distribution

% Total payroll paid under the table by income group (by country)


% of Total Payroll as PUT
by Income Relative to the Minimum Wage



PUTs across the Income Distribution

Extensive margin by income group (by country)


Fraction of PUT receivers
by Income Relative to the Minimum Wage




PUTs across the Income Distribution

Intensive margin by income group (by country)

% of Earnings received as PUT
by Income Relative to the Minimum Wage




PUTs across the Firm Size Distribution



PUTs across the Firm Size Distribution

Fraction of formal employees receiving PUTs by firm size (by country)

Fraction of PUT receivers
by Firm Size



Managers and Interactions with Owners


Questions:

1. In your main job, Do you hold any managerial position?
→ *Yes, No*
2. Do you have frequent interaction with your employer?
→ *Never, Sometimes, Usually, Always* (Brazil) *Yes, No* (other countries)

We group Brazil's answers in two: "*Never*" and "*Sometimes*" as "*No*", and same for "*Yes*"


Managerial Positions

% of Total payroll paid under the table by occupation group



Interaction with Owners

% of Total payroll paid under the table by proximity to owners



Tax Morale

Questions:

1. From 1 to 10 (where 1 is not justified at all, and 10 is fully justified),
How justified is it to evade taxes?

→ 1, ..., 10

$$PUT_{i(j)}^{ext} = \sum_{c \in C} \alpha_c \mathbf{1}[c = j] + \varepsilon_{i(j)} \quad (1)$$

$$PUT_{i(j)}^{ext} = \sum_{c \in C} \alpha_c \mathbf{1}[c = j] + \Gamma X + \varepsilon_{i(j)} \quad (2)$$

→ Where $PUT_{i(j)}^{ext}$ is whether individual i from country j receives PUTs or not.



→ X includes wage and firm size fixed effects

We plot the mean-corrected residuals $\hat{\varepsilon}_{i(j)}$ and $\hat{\varepsilon}_{i(j)}$ on question 1.

Tax Morale


Fraction of formal employees receiving PUTs by level of tax morale

Tax Morale: How Justifiable is it to Evade Taxes?



Tax Morale

Fraction of formal employees receiving PUTs by level of tax morale (by country)




Disbursement and Reasons

Questions:

1. How do you receive the PUTs?
 - *Check, bank transfer, cash, good and services, additional self-employed contract, food or transport card, virtual app, other*
2. In your case, which were key factors when determining how much to report in the payroll?
 - *Income tax, minimum wage, employers' contributions, employees' contributions, extra-hours, tax audits, labor lawsuits, garbage tax, others*



Disbursement Methods



Disbursement Methods

Fraction receiving in cash (only PUT receivers)



Fraction of PUT Receivers who Only use Cash as the Disbursement Method



Disbursement Methods


Fraction receiving through virtual payment or wire (only PUT receivers)

Fraction of PUT Receivers who Only use Wires as the Disbursement Method



Reasons



Fraction responding that each category is relevant to determine PUTs



Reasons

Fraction responding income tax is relevant for PUT by income

Fraction of PUT Receivers who
Mentioned the Income Tax as a Factor



Conclusions and Future Work

1. More countries: Ecuador, Venezuela, Uruguay, Bolivia, Paraguay
2. Employees' incentives
 - Top marginal income tax rate, exemption thresholds
 - Social security benefits (pay-as-you-go versus capitalization systems)
3. Employers' incentives
 - Revenue versus profit taxes
 - Labor costs
 - Whistle-blowing institutions
4. Economic development
 - Share of total employees in small and medium-sized firms
 - Classic informality